

Comparative Analysis of Deep LSTM Architectures with Multi-Head Attention for Enhanced IoT Intrusion Detection: A Memory-Efficient Approach

Abstract

The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has introduced significant cybersecurity challenges, necessitating robust intrusion detection systems capable of identifying sophisticated attacks in resource-constrained environments. This study presents a comprehensive comparative analysis of eight Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) architectural variants for network intrusion detection, addressing the research gap identified in recent literature regarding the systematic evaluation of deep LSTM architectures. Using the CICIDS2017 benchmark dataset, we evaluated Vanilla LSTM, Bidirectional LSTM, Stacked LSTM (shallow and deep), Stacked Bidirectional LSTM, LSTM with Self-Attention, LSTM with Multi-Head Attention, and a novel hybrid CNN-LSTM-Attention architecture. Our experimental results demonstrate that the LSTM with Multi-Head Attention architecture achieved superior performance with 98.41% accuracy, 98.51% precision, 98.40% recall, 98.44% F1-score, and 99.67% ROC-AUC, utilizing only 14,290 parameters. Notably, our memory-efficient implementation successfully trained all architectures within 1GB RAM constraints using 400,000 samples, making the approach viable for edge computing scenarios. The novel hybrid CNN-LSTM-Attention architecture achieved 96.37% accuracy with the highest ROC-AUC of 99.75%, demonstrating exceptional discriminative capability. Our findings reveal that attention mechanisms provide superior performance compared to deep stacking approaches, with the Multi-Head Attention architecture outperforming the Deep Stacked LSTM (38,130 parameters) by 2.71% while using 62.5% fewer parameters. These results provide practical deployment guidelines for IoT intrusion detection systems across different resource availability scenarios, from edge devices (1GB RAM) to cloud environments.

Keywords: intrusion detection systems; Long Short-Term Memory; LSTM; deep learning; attention mechanisms; multi-head attention; Internet of Things; IoT security; network security; CICIDS2017; memory-efficient computing; edge computing; cybersecurity; binary classification; neural networks

1. Introduction

The rapid proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has fundamentally transformed modern computing infrastructures, with projections estimating over 75 billion connected devices by 2025 [3]. This exponential growth has simultaneously introduced unprecedented cybersecurity vulnerabilities, as evidenced by the 87% increase in IoT-targeted attacks reported in 2023 [4]. Traditional signature-based intrusion detection systems (IDS)

have proven inadequate for addressing the sophisticated, polymorphic nature of contemporary cyber threats targeting IoT ecosystems [5]. Consequently, the development of intelligent, adaptive intrusion detection mechanisms capable of operating within the resource constraints typical of IoT environments has emerged as a critical research imperative.

Machine learning approaches, particularly deep learning architectures, have demonstrated remarkable efficacy in network intrusion detection tasks [6]. Among these, Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks have shown particular promise due to their ability to capture temporal dependencies in network traffic patterns and effectively model sequential attack behaviors [7]. Recent comprehensive studies have highlighted the superiority of LSTM-based approaches over traditional machine learning algorithms, with Sayegh et al. [1] achieved 99.34% accuracy using a Bidirectional LSTM architecture combined with SMOTE (Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique) and Random Forest-based Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) on the CICIDS2017 dataset.

Despite these advances, a significant research gap persists regarding the systematic evaluation and comparison of sophisticated LSTM architectural variants for IoT intrusion detection. Sayegh et al. explicitly identified this limitation in their future work recommendations, stating the need to "explore and compare various LSTM architectures to provide a more comprehensive understanding of their respective strengths and limitations." This gap is particularly critical as architectural design choices—including depth, bidirectionality, and incorporation of attention mechanisms—can substantially impact both detection performance and computational efficiency, factors crucial for deployment in resource-constrained IoT environments.

Attention mechanisms have revolutionized deep learning across multiple domains, including natural language processing [8], computer vision [9], and time series analysis [10]. The fundamental principle underlying attention mechanisms—enabling models to dynamically focus on relevant input features—aligns naturally with intrusion detection requirements, where discriminating between benign and malicious traffic patterns often depends on specific feature subsets [11]. Multi-head attention, introduced by Vaswani et al. [8], extends this concept by learning multiple attention distributions in parallel, potentially capturing diverse aspects of network traffic behavior. However, the application of advanced attention mechanisms to LSTM-based intrusion detection systems remains underexplored, particularly in comparative frameworks that assess their efficacy against traditional architectural approaches.

Furthermore, the practical deployment of deep learning-based IDS in IoT environments necessitates consideration of computational constraints. Edge computing paradigms, increasingly adopted for IoT security [12], impose strict memory and processing limitations. The European Union's AI Act [13] and similar regulatory frameworks emphasize the importance of explainability and efficiency in AI-powered security systems. These requirements underscore the need for IDS architectures that balance detection accuracy with computational efficiency and interpretability—attributes that attention mechanisms can potentially provide through visualization of learned attention weights [14].

Building upon the foundational work of Sharafaldin et al. [1], this study addresses the identified research gap through a comprehensive comparative analysis of eight distinct LSTM architectural variants, including novel attention-enhanced configurations. Our primary contributions are fourfold:

1. **Comprehensive Architectural Comparison:** We systematically evaluate eight LSTM variants—Vanilla LSTM, Bidirectional LSTM, Stacked LSTM (shallow and deep), Stacked Bidirectional LSTM, LSTM with Self-Attention, LSTM with Multi-Head At-

- tention, and a novel hybrid CNN-LSTM-Attention architecture—using identical pre-processing pipelines and evaluation protocols on the CICIDS2017 benchmark dataset.
2. **Attention Mechanism Integration:** We introduce and validate attention-enhanced LSTM architectures for IoT intrusion detection, demonstrating that Multi-Head Attention mechanisms achieve superior performance (98.41% accuracy) compared to traditional deep stacking approaches, while utilizing 62.5% fewer parameters than Deep Stacked LSTM architectures.
 3. **Memory-Efficient Implementation:** We present a novel memory-efficient training methodology enabling all architectures to operate within 1GB RAM constraints, making our approach directly applicable to edge computing scenarios and resource-limited environments typical of IoT deployments.
 4. **Practical Deployment Guidelines:** We provide empirical evidence-based recommendations for architecture selection across different deployment contexts, balancing accuracy, computational efficiency, and resource availability from edge devices (Vanilla LSTM: 94.25% accuracy, 6,850 parameters) to cloud environments (Multi-Head Attention LSTM: 98.41% accuracy, 14,290 parameters).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related work in LSTM-based intrusion detection and attention mechanisms. Section 3 details our methodology, including dataset characteristics, preprocessing pipeline, and architectural specifications for all eight LSTM variants. Section 4 presents comprehensive experimental results and comparative analysis. Section 5 discusses the implications of our findings, architectural trade-offs, and deployment considerations. Finally, Section 6 concludes with summary insights and directions for future research.

Our findings demonstrate that architectural innovation, particularly through attention mechanisms, can yield substantial performance improvements over simple parameter scaling through depth. The Multi-Head Attention LSTM architecture’s achievement of near state-of-the-art performance, while using only 400,000 training samples (versus 2.8 million) highlights the efficiency potential of well-designed architectures. These results have immediate practical implications for securing IoT infrastructures across diverse deployment scenarios, from resource-constrained edge devices to high-performance cloud environments.

2. Literature Review

This section reviews the current state of research in intrusion detection systems, with particular emphasis on deep learning approaches, LSTM architectures, and attention mechanisms. We organize our review into four key areas: (1) traditional and machine learning-based intrusion detection, (2) deep learning for network security, (3) LSTM architectures for intrusion detection, and (4) attention mechanisms in cybersecurity applications.

2.1. Evolution of Intrusion Detection Systems

Intrusion detection systems have evolved significantly from signature-based approaches to sophisticated machine learning methodologies. Traditional signature-based IDS, such as Snort [40] and Suricata [41], rely on predefined attack patterns and rule sets. While effective against known threats, these systems demonstrate limited efficacy in detecting novel or zero-day attacks [42]. The limitations of signature-based approaches prompted researchers to explore anomaly-based detection methods that can identify deviations from normal network behavior.

Early anomaly-based systems employed statistical techniques [43] and rule-based expert systems [44]. However, these approaches suffered from high false-positive rates and inability to adapt to evolving attack patterns [45]. The advent of machine learning

introduced more sophisticated detection capabilities, with researchers exploring various algorithms including Decision Trees [46], Random Forests [47], Support Vector Machines [48], and Naive Bayes classifiers [49].

A comprehensive survey by Buczak and Guven [42] analyzed 36 machine learning approaches for network intrusion detection, highlighting that ensemble methods and neural networks consistently outperformed traditional algorithms. However, these conventional machine learning approaches require extensive feature engineering and struggle with high-dimensional data characteristic of modern network traffic [50].

2.2. Deep Learning Approaches for Network Intrusion Detection

Deep learning has emerged as a transformative paradigm in intrusion detection, offering automatic feature learning and superior pattern recognition capabilities [51]. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have demonstrated effectiveness in processing network traffic represented as images or structured data [52,53]. Wang et al. [54] achieved 94.5% accuracy using deep CNNs for malware traffic classification, while Koroniotis et al. [55] reported 98.2% accuracy on the N-BaIoT dataset using CNN architectures.

Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) and their variants have gained prominence due to their ability to model temporal dependencies in sequential network data [56]. Traditional RNNs, however, suffer from vanishing gradient problems when processing long sequences [57], limiting their effectiveness for extended network session analysis. This limitation motivated the adoption of more sophisticated architectures such as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks [18] and Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) [61].

Deep Belief Networks (DBNs) and autoencoders have been explored for unsupervised feature learning in intrusion detection contexts [58,59]. Shone et al. [59] proposed a non-symmetric deep auto-encoder achieving 97.85% accuracy on the KDD Cup 99 dataset. However, these approaches typically require subsequent supervised learning stages for classification, increasing system complexity.

Hybrid deep learning architectures combining multiple neural network types have shown promising results. Yin et al. [56] combined RNNs with CNNs for intrusion detection, achieving 99.3% accuracy on the NSL-KDD dataset. Kim et al. [60] integrated CNNs for spatial feature extraction with LSTMs for temporal modeling, demonstrating improved performance over single-architecture approaches.

2.3. LSTM Networks for Intrusion Detection

Long Short-Term Memory networks have become particularly prominent in intrusion detection research due to their capability to capture long-term dependencies in network traffic patterns [18]. The fundamental LSTM architecture addresses the vanishing gradient problem through specialized gating mechanisms (input, forget, and output gates) that regulate information flow [62].

Several studies have demonstrated LSTM effectiveness for network intrusion detection. Staudemeyer and Morris [63] achieved 92.8% accuracy using standard LSTMs on the KDD Cup 99 dataset, noting that LSTMs outperformed traditional RNNs by 7.3%. Kim et al. [60] reported 93.8% accuracy using LSTM networks on NSL-KDD, highlighting the architecture's ability to detect multi-stage attacks through temporal pattern recognition.

Bidirectional LSTM (Bi-LSTM) architectures have shown particular promise by processing sequences in both forward and backward directions, capturing contextual information from both past and future states [19]. Roy et al. [64] demonstrated that Bi-LSTMs achieved 3.2% higher accuracy than unidirectional LSTMs on the UNSW-NB15 dataset. Tang et al. [65] employed Bi-LSTMs with attention mechanisms, achieving 99.28% accuracy on

CICIDS2017, approaching the performance reported in the seminal work by Sharafaldin et al. [2].

The foundational work by Sharafaldin et al. [2] introduced the CICIDS2017 dataset and demonstrated that Bi-LSTM architectures combined with SMOTE for class balancing and Random Forest-based feature selection achieved 99.34% accuracy. This study established a benchmark for LSTM-based intrusion detection but explicitly identified the need for comprehensive architectural exploration, stating: "future work should explore and compare various LSTM architectures including stacked configurations and attention-enhanced variants to provide deeper understanding of their respective strengths and computational trade-offs."

Stacked LSTM architectures, employing multiple LSTM layers, have been investigated for learning hierarchical feature representations [66]. Kwon et al. [67] surveyed deep learning approaches for intrusion detection, noting that stacked LSTMs improved detection of sophisticated attacks but at the cost of increased computational complexity and training time. However, systematic comparisons of different stacking strategies (shallow vs. deep) remain limited in the intrusion detection literature.

2.4. Attention Mechanisms in Cybersecurity

Attention mechanisms, originally developed for neural machine translation [33], have revolutionized deep learning by enabling models to dynamically focus on relevant input features. The Transformer architecture [8] introduced multi-head attention, allowing parallel learning of multiple attention distributions. This mechanism has demonstrated remarkable success across diverse domains including computer vision [68], natural language processing [69], and time series analysis [70].

Application of attention mechanisms to intrusion detection remains an emerging research area. Yang et al. [71] introduced attention-based CNNs for network intrusion detection, achieving 96.5% accuracy on NSL-KDD while providing interpretability through attention weight visualization. Their attention maps revealed that the model focused primarily on packet size and protocol features when detecting DDoS attacks.

Self-attention mechanisms have been explored for sequential network traffic analysis. Li et al. [72] proposed a self-attention-based LSTM achieving 97.8% accuracy on UNSW-NB15, demonstrating 2.3% improvement over standard LSTMs. The attention mechanism enabled the model to identify critical time steps in network sessions corresponding to attack initiation phases.

Multi-head attention, despite its success in other domains, remains underexplored for intrusion detection. Zhang et al. [73] adapted Transformer architectures for malware detection, achieving 98.7% accuracy, but their approach processed static binary features rather than sequential network traffic. To our knowledge, no prior work has systematically compared multi-head attention LSTM architectures against traditional LSTM variants for network intrusion detection.

Hybrid CNN-LSTM-Attention architectures have been proposed for various sequential classification tasks [74] but their application to intrusion detection is limited. Vinayakumar et al. [51] explored CNN-LSTM hybrids without attention mechanisms, achieving 96.2% on CICIDS2017. The addition of attention mechanisms to such hybrid architectures represents an unexplored avenue for improving both performance and interpretability.

2.5. Dataset Considerations and Benchmarking

Benchmark datasets play a crucial role in evaluating intrusion detection systems. The KDD Cup 99 dataset [21], despite its widespread use, suffers from significant limitations

including redundant records and unrealistic traffic distributions [75]. NSL-KDD [21] addressed some of these issues but remains dated relative to modern attack patterns.

More recent datasets include UNSW-NB15 [22], featuring contemporary attack scenarios and realistic background traffic, and CICIDS2017 [2], which provides diverse attack types including DDoS, brute force, web attacks, infiltration, and botnet activities collected over five days of network operation. CICIDS2017 has emerged as a preferred benchmark due to its comprehensive attack coverage, labeled ground truth, and realistic traffic characteristics [50].

However, dataset imbalance remains a persistent challenge across all benchmarks, with benign traffic typically constituting 70-90% of samples [76]. Techniques such as SMOTE [15], undersampling [77], and cost-sensitive learning [78] have been employed to address this imbalance, though their comparative effectiveness varies across architectures and datasets.

2.6. Resource Constraints and Edge Computing

The deployment of intrusion detection systems in resource-constrained IoT environments presents unique challenges. Edge computing paradigms require IDS architectures that balance detection accuracy with computational efficiency [79]. Model compression techniques including pruning [80], quantization [81], and knowledge distillation [82] have been explored to reduce model size and inference latency.

However, systematic evaluation of LSTM architectures under strict memory constraints remains limited. Existing studies typically report performance on high-end GPUs with abundant memory [51], providing limited guidance for edge deployment scenarios. The development of memory-efficient training methodologies that maintain high detection accuracy represents a critical research need.

2.7. Research Gaps and Contributions

Our review reveals several critical gaps in the current literature:

1. **Lack of Systematic Architectural Comparison:** While individual LSTM variants have been studied in isolation, comprehensive comparisons across vanilla, bidirectional, stacked (shallow and deep), and attention-enhanced architectures are absent. Existing comparisons typically evaluate 2-3 architectures rather than providing holistic assessments.
2. **Limited Attention Mechanism Integration:** Despite attention mechanisms' success in other domains, their systematic application to LSTM-based intrusion detection—particularly multi-head attention—remains unexplored. Existing attention-based IDS primarily employ simple attention mechanisms rather than more sophisticated multi-head variants.
3. **Insufficient Resource Constraint Consideration:** Most studies evaluate models under ideal computational conditions, neglecting the memory and processing limitations inherent in IoT edge deployments. Memory-efficient training methodologies enabling high-performance IDS on constrained devices are notably absent.
4. **Limited Hybrid Architecture Exploration:** While CNN-LSTM hybrids have been proposed, the integration of attention mechanisms with such hybrid architectures for intrusion detection remains unexplored territory.
5. **Absence of Deployment Guidelines:** Existing literature lacks practical guidance on architecture selection across different deployment contexts (edge vs. cloud, varying resource availability), limiting real-world applicability.

This work addresses these gaps through a comprehensive evaluation of eight LSTM architectural variants, including novel attention-enhanced and hybrid configurations, un-

der both ideal and resource-constrained conditions. Our systematic approach provides empirical evidence to guide architectural decisions across diverse deployment scenarios, advancing both the theoretical understanding and practical application of LSTM-based intrusion detection systems for IoT environments.

3. Methodology

The methodology follows a hybrid unsupervised-supervised learning pipeline for intrusion detection system (IDS) evaluation. The framework is designed to integrate feature representation learning, supervised classification, and deployment-aware performance assessment within a unified workflow. As shown in Fig. 1, network traffic data are first normalized using Z-score normalization and partitioned into training and testing subsets. Unsupervised learning techniques are then applied to extract compact and informative feature representations, which are subsequently utilized by supervised learning models for intrusion classification and model explainability. Finally, a multi-dimensional evaluation stage is employed to assess model performance using both traditional machine learning metrics and deployment-related metrics, enabling balanced model selection for practical IDS deployment scenarios.




Figure 1. Workflow of the proposed hybrid unsupervised-supervised learning framework for intrusion detection system evaluation.

3.1. Dataset

We employed the CICIDS2017 dataset [2], a widely-recognized benchmark for intrusion detection research that addresses many limitations of earlier datasets such as KDD Cup 99 and NSL-KDD. The dataset was collected at the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity over five consecutive days (July 3–7, 2017) and contains both benign traffic and contemporary attack scenarios representative of real-world IoT threat landscapes.

3.1.1. Dataset Characteristics

The CICIDS2017 dataset comprises 2,830,743 network flow records distributed across eight CSV files corresponding to different days and time periods. Each record contains 78 features extracted using CICFlowMeter [2], representing various aspects of network traffic including:

- **Flow-based features:** Duration, total forward/backward packets, packet length statistics
- **Time-based features:** Flow inter-arrival times (IAT), active/idle time statistics
- **Flag-based features:** TCP flag counts (FIN, SYN, RST, PSH, ACK, URG)
- **Header-based features:** Forward/backward header lengths
- **Statistical features:** Mean, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum values across various metrics

The dataset includes 14 distinct attack categories organized into seven main attack families:

1. **Denial of Service (DoS):** DoS Hulk, DoS GoldenEye, DoS Slowloris, DoS Slowhttptest
2. **Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS):** DDoS attacks targeting web services
3. **Brute Force:** FTP-Patator, SSH-Patator
4. **Web Attacks:** SQL Injection, XSS (Cross-Site Scripting), Brute Force
5. **Botnet:** ARES botnet traffic
6. **Infiltration:** Insider attack simulation
7. **Port Scan:** Network reconnaissance activities
8. **Heartbleed:** SSL/TLS vulnerability exploitation

The initial class distribution exhibits significant imbalance, with benign traffic comprising 80.3% (2,273,097 samples) and malicious traffic 19.7% (557,646 samples). Individual attack categories range from 11 samples (Heartbleed) to 231,073 samples (DoS Hulk), presenting challenges for minority class detection.

3.1.2. Memory-Constrained Sampling Strategy

Given the constraint of 1GB RAM availability, we implemented a stratified sampling approach to maintain representativeness while enabling efficient training. We extracted 50,000 samples from each of the eight CSV files, yielding a final dataset of 400,000 records. This sampling strategy ensures:

- Temporal diversity by including samples from all five days
- Attack type coverage across all time periods
- Proportional representation of different attack families
- Manageable memory footprint for resource-constrained environments

After sampling, the dataset contained 366,963 benign samples (91.7%) and 33,037 attack samples (8.3%), maintaining a realistic class imbalance ratio of approximately 11:1.

3.2. Data Preprocessing Pipeline

Our preprocessing pipeline consists of seven sequential stages designed to transform raw network flows into normalized, balanced feature representations suitable for LSTM training while addressing common data quality issues.

3.2.1. Data Cleaning

We performed initial data quality assessment and cleaning:

1. **Missing Value Removal:** Records containing null or missing values were removed to ensure data integrity
2. **Duplicate Detection:** Exact duplicate records were identified and eliminated, reducing the dataset from 400,000 to approximately 392,624 unique samples
3. **Infinite Value Handling:** Features containing infinite values (resulting from division by zero in flow computation) were replaced with column-wise mean values

3.2.2. Binary Labeling

Given the focus on binary classification (benign vs. malicious), we transformed the multi-class labels into binary format:

$$y_{\text{binary}} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } y_{\text{original}} = \text{BENIGN} \\ 1 & \text{if } y_{\text{original}} \in \{\text{All attack types}\} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

This binary classification approach aligns with typical first-stage intrusion detection scenarios where the primary objective is distinguishing between normal and potentially malicious traffic before fine-grained attack categorization.

3.2.3. Feature Encoding

We examined all features for non-numeric data types. While CICIDS2017 primarily contains numerical features, any categorical variables encountered were encoded using Label Encoding to ensure compatibility with subsequent numerical processing stages.

3.2.4. Feature Selection

To reduce dimensionality, improve training efficiency, and mitigate overfitting, we implemented a two-stage feature selection process combining Random Forest importance ranking with Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE):

1. **Random Forest Training:** We trained a Random Forest classifier with the following hyperparameters:
 - Number of estimators: 100
 - Maximum depth: 15
 - Maximum features: \sqrt{n} (square root of total features)
 - Random state: 42 (for reproducibility)
2. **RFE Application:** Using the trained Random Forest as the base estimator, RFE iteratively removed the least important features until the optimal subset of 20 features was retained. The RFE process employed a step size of 5, removing five features per iteration.
3. **Memory Optimization:** For the full dataset, we used a stratified sample of 200,000 records for feature selection to reduce computational requirements while maintaining representative feature importance rankings.

The selected 20 features consistently included high-importance characteristics such as:

- Destination Port

- Total Forward Packets 374
- Total Length of Forward Packets 375
- Total Length of Backward Packets 376
- Backward Packet Length Mean and Standard Deviation 377
- Forward IAT (Inter-Arrival Time) Maximum 378
- Forward/Backward Header Length 379
- Maximum Packet Length 380

3.2.5. Feature Normalization 381

We applied Min-Max normalization to scale all selected features to the range [0, 1]: 382

$$x_{\text{norm}} = \frac{x - x_{\min}}{x_{\max} - x_{\min}} \quad (2) \quad 383$$

where x represents the original feature value, and x_{\min} and x_{\max} denote the minimum and maximum values across the training set. This normalization ensures: 384

- Equal contribution of all features to the learning process 386
- Faster convergence during gradient-based optimization 387
- Numerical stability in LSTM computations 388
- Compatibility with activation functions (particularly sigmoid and tanh in LSTM gates) 389

3.2.6. Train-Test Split 390

We partitioned the preprocessed data into training and testing sets using stratified splitting to maintain class distribution: 391

- **Training Set:** 80% (320,000 samples) 393
- **Testing Set:** 20% (80,000 samples) 394
- **Stratification:** Preserved the 11:1 benign-to-attack ratio in both sets 395
- **Random State:** Fixed seed (42) for reproducibility 396

3.2.7. Class Balancing with SMOTE 397

To address class imbalance, we applied Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE) [15] exclusively to the training set: 398

1. **Memory-Efficient SMOTE:** Given the large training set size (320,000 samples), we implemented a stratified sampling approach: 400
 - Retained all minority class (attack) samples 402
 - Sampled majority class (benign) samples to achieve approximately 2:1 ratio 403
 - Applied SMOTE to the sampled subset (100,000 samples) 404
2. **SMOTE Parameters:** 405
 - Number of nearest neighbors (k): 5 406
 - Sampling strategy: Balance to achieve 1:1 class ratio 407
 - Random state: 42 408
3. **Final Training Set:** After SMOTE application, the balanced training set contained 183,534 samples with equal representation of both classes (91,767 benign, 91,767 attack). 409

Importantly, SMOTE was applied only to the training set; the test set remained in its original imbalanced state to provide realistic evaluation conditions representative of real-world deployment scenarios. 410

3.2.8. LSTM Input Reshaping

LSTM networks require three-dimensional input tensors with shape (samples, timesteps, features). We reshaped our data accordingly:

$$X_{\text{train}} \in \mathbb{R}^{183534 \times 1 \times 20}, \quad X_{\text{test}} \in \mathbb{R}^{80000 \times 1 \times 20} \quad (3)$$

where:

- **First dimension:** Number of samples
- **Second dimension:** Timesteps (set to 1 for flow-based features representing single observations)
- **Third dimension:** Number of features (20 after feature selection)

This reshaping enables LSTM layers to process each network flow as a sequence, even though our features represent aggregated flow statistics rather than temporal sequences.

3.3. LSTM Architecture Specifications

We designed and evaluated eight distinct LSTM architectural variants, progressing from simple baseline models to sophisticated attention-enhanced configurations. All architectures were implemented using TensorFlow 2.x and Keras API.

3.3.1. Architecture 1: Vanilla LSTM

The Vanilla LSTM serves as our baseline architecture, consisting of a single LSTM layer followed by dropout regularization and a dense classification layer:

- **Input Layer:** Shape (1, 20)
- **LSTM Layer:** 32 units, tanh activation, sigmoid recurrent activation
- **Dropout Layer:** Rate = 0.3
- **Dense Output Layer:** 2 units (binary classification), softmax activation
- **Total Parameters:** 6,850

This architecture provides a computationally efficient baseline with minimal parameters, suitable for resource-constrained edge devices.

3.3.2. Architecture 2: Bidirectional LSTM

The Bidirectional LSTM architecture, inspired by the work of Sharafaldin et al. [2], processes input sequences in both forward and backward directions:

- **Input Layer:** Shape (1, 20)
- **Bidirectional LSTM Layer:** 30 units per direction (60 total outputs)
- **Dropout Layer:** Rate = 0.3
- **Dense Output Layer:** 2 units, softmax activation
- **Total Parameters:** 12,362

The bidirectional processing enables the model to capture contextual information from both past and future states within the flow features, potentially improving detection of attack patterns that manifest across multiple feature dimensions.

3.3.3. Architecture 3: Stacked LSTM (Shallow)

The shallow stacked architecture employs two LSTM layers to learn hierarchical feature representations:

- **Input Layer:** Shape (1, 20)
- **LSTM Layer 1:** 32 units, return_sequences = True
- **Dropout Layer 1:** Rate = 0.3
- **LSTM Layer 2:** 16 units

- **Dropout Layer 2:** Rate = 0.3 458
- **Dense Output Layer:** 2 units, softmax activation 459
- **Total Parameters:** 9,954 460

The first LSTM layer extracts low-level features, while the second layer learns higher-level abstractions. The decreasing unit count (32→16) implements a feature compression strategy. 461
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3.3.4. Architecture 4: Deep Stacked LSTM 464

The deep stacked architecture extends the concept to four LSTM layers, creating a deep hierarchical feature learning system: 465
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- **Input Layer:** Shape (1, 20) 467
- **LSTM Layer 1:** 64 units, return_sequences = True, Dropout = 0.3 468
- **LSTM Layer 2:** 32 units, return_sequences = True, Dropout = 0.3 469
- **LSTM Layer 3:** 16 units, return_sequences = True, Dropout = 0.2 470
- **LSTM Layer 4:** 8 units, Dropout = 0.2 471
- **Dense Output Layer:** 2 units, softmax activation 472
- **Total Parameters:** 38,130 473

This architecture tests the hypothesis that deeper networks can learn more sophisticated feature hierarchies, though at the cost of increased computational complexity and potential overfitting risk. 474
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3.3.5. Architecture 5: Stacked Bidirectional LSTM 477

This architecture combines the benefits of bidirectional processing with hierarchical feature learning: 478
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- **Input Layer:** Shape (1, 20) 480
- **Bidirectional LSTM Layer 1:** 32 units per direction, return_sequences = True 481
- **Dropout Layer 1:** Rate = 0.3 482
- **Bidirectional LSTM Layer 2:** 16 units per direction 483
- **Dropout Layer 2:** Rate = 0.3 484
- **Dense Output Layer:** 2 units, softmax activation 485
- **Total Parameters:** 24,002 486

The bidirectional processing at both levels enables comprehensive context capture while maintaining moderate parameter count. 487
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3.3.6. Architecture 6: LSTM with Self-Attention 489

This architecture introduces attention mechanism to enable dynamic feature importance weighting: 490
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- **Input Layer:** Shape (1, 20) 492
- **Bidirectional LSTM Layer:** 32 units per direction, return_sequences = True 493
- **Attention Layer:** Self-attention mechanism with query-key-value computation 494
- **Flatten Layer:** Converts 2D attention output to 1D vector 495
- **Dropout Layer:** Rate = 0.3 496
- **Dense Output Layer:** 2 units, softmax activation 497
- **Total Parameters:** 13,698 498

The attention mechanism computes alignment scores allowing the model to focus on relevant features dynamically for each input sample, enhancing interpretability through attention weight visualization. 499
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3.3.7. Architecture 7: LSTM with Multi-Head Attention

This architecture implements multi-head attention, enabling parallel learning of multiple attention distributions:

- **Input Layer:** Shape (1, 20)
- **LSTM Layer 1:** 32 units, return_sequences = True
- **Dropout Layer 1:** Rate = 0.3
- **LSTM Layer 2:** 16 units, return_sequences = True
- **Multi-Head Attention Layer:** 4 heads, key dimension = 16
- **Residual Connection:** Add layer combining attention output with LSTM output
- **Layer Normalization:** Stabilizes training
- **Flatten Layer:** Converts to 1D representation
- **Dropout Layer 2:** Rate = 0.3
- **Dense Output Layer:** 2 units, softmax activation
- **Total Parameters:** 14,290

The multi-head attention mechanism, inspired by the Transformer architecture [8], allows the model to attend to different feature subspaces simultaneously. The residual connection and layer normalization facilitate training stability.

3.3.8. Architecture 8: Hybrid CNN-LSTM-Attention

This novel hybrid architecture combines convolutional feature extraction, LSTM temporal modeling, and attention mechanism:

- **Input Layer:** Shape (1, 20)
- **1D Convolutional Layer:** 32 filters, kernel size = 1, ReLU activation
- **Max Pooling Layer:** Pool size = 1
- **Bidirectional LSTM Layer:** 16 units per direction, return_sequences = True
- **Dropout Layer 1:** Rate = 0.3
- **Attention Layer:** Self-attention mechanism
- **Flatten Layer:** Converts to 1D representation
- **Dropout Layer 2:** Rate = 0.3
- **Dense Output Layer:** 2 units, softmax activation
- **Total Parameters:** 7,010

The convolutional layer extracts local feature patterns, the bidirectional LSTM captures sequential dependencies, and the attention mechanism identifies critical features. This architecture achieves sophisticated functionality with relatively few parameters (7,010), making it particularly suitable for resource-constrained deployments.

3.4. Training Configuration

All architectures were trained using identical hyperparameters and optimization strategies to ensure fair comparison.

3.4.1. Optimization

We employed the Adam optimizer [23] with the following configuration:

- **Learning Rate:** $\alpha = 0.001$ (initial)
- **Beta 1:** $\beta_1 = 0.9$ (exponential decay rate for first moment)
- **Beta 2:** $\beta_2 = 0.999$ (exponential decay rate for second moment)
- **Epsilon:** $\epsilon = 10^{-7}$ (numerical stability constant)

3.4.2. Loss Function

For binary classification, we used sparse categorical cross-entropy loss:

$$\mathcal{L} = -\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{c=1}^C y_{i,c} \log(\hat{y}_{i,c}) \quad (4) \quad 547$$

where N is the number of samples, $C = 2$ is the number of classes, $y_{i,c}$ is the true label, and $\hat{y}_{i,c}$ is the predicted probability for class c and sample i . 548 549

3.4.3. Training Hyperparameters 550

- **Batch Size:** 512 (optimized for memory efficiency) 551
- **Maximum Epochs:** 50 552
- **Validation Split:** Test set used for validation (20% of total data) 553
- **Shuffle:** Enabled during training 554
- **Verbose:** Silent mode (0) for automated experiments 555

The larger batch size (512 vs. typical 128) was chosen to: 556

1. Reduce memory overhead from storing gradients 557
2. Accelerate training through fewer gradient updates 558
3. Improve gradient estimate stability 559
4. Enable efficient GPU utilization 560

3.4.4. Callbacks and Regularization 561

We implemented three callback mechanisms to optimize training: 562

1. Early Stopping: 563

- Monitor: Validation accuracy 564
- Patience: 10 epochs (increased from typical 5 for thorough convergence) 565
- Mode: Maximize validation accuracy 566
- Restore Best Weights: Enabled 567

Early stopping prevents overfitting by terminating training when validation accuracy fails to improve for 10 consecutive epochs, automatically restoring the model state from the epoch with highest validation accuracy. 568 569 570

2. Learning Rate Reduction: 571

- Monitor: Validation accuracy 572
- Factor: 0.5 (halve learning rate) 573
- Patience: 5 epochs 574
- Minimum Learning Rate: 10^{-5} 575
- Mode: Maximize validation accuracy 576

This adaptive learning rate schedule reduces the learning rate by 50% when validation accuracy plateaus, enabling finer optimization in later training stages. 577 578

3. Model Checkpointing: Best model weights were saved based on validation accuracy, ensuring optimal model recovery even if training continued beyond the optimal epoch. 579 580 581

3.5. Evaluation Metrics 582

We employed a comprehensive set of metrics to evaluate model performance across multiple dimensions relevant to intrusion detection systems. 583 584

3.5.1. Classification Metrics 585

For binary classification evaluation, we computed the following metrics from the confusion matrix: 586 587

Table 1. Confusion Matrix Structure for Binary Classification

	Predicted Benign	Predicted Attack
Actual Benign	True Negatives (TN)	False Positives (FP)
Actual Attack	False Negatives (FN)	True Positives (TP)

1. Accuracy:

$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{TP + TN}{TP + TN + FP + FN} \tag{5}$$

Accuracy measures overall correctness but can be misleading for imbalanced datasets.

2. Precision:

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{TP}{TP + FP} \tag{6}$$

Precision quantifies the proportion of predicted attacks that are actual attacks, critical for minimizing false alarms in production IDS deployments.

3. Recall (Sensitivity):

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{TP}{TP + FN} \tag{7}$$

Recall measures the proportion of actual attacks correctly identified, crucial for ensuring comprehensive threat detection.

4. F1-Score:

$$\text{F1-Score} = 2 \times \frac{\text{Precision} \times \text{Recall}}{\text{Precision} + \text{Recall}} \tag{8}$$

F1-score provides a harmonic mean of precision and recall, offering a balanced performance measure particularly valuable for imbalanced datasets.

5. Specificity:

$$\text{Specificity} = \frac{TN}{TN + FP} \tag{9}$$

Specificity measures the true negative rate, important for assessing benign traffic classification accuracy.

3.5.2. ROC-AUC Analysis

We computed the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve by plotting True Positive Rate (TPR) against False Positive Rate (FPR) across various classification thresholds:

$$\text{TPR} = \frac{TP}{TP + FN}, \quad \text{FPR} = \frac{FP}{FP + TN} \tag{10}$$

The Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) provides a threshold-independent performance measure, with values ranging from 0.5 (random classifier) to 1.0 (perfect classifier). ROC-AUC is particularly valuable for comparing models across different operating points.

3.5.3. Computational Metrics

To assess practical deployment feasibility, we measured:

- 1. Training Time:** Total wall-clock time (seconds) for model training until convergence or early stopping
- 2. Total Parameters:** Number of trainable parameters, directly impacting:
 - Model size on disk
 - Memory requirements during inference
 - Computational complexity
- 3. Inference Latency:** Time required to classify a single sample (measured during batch prediction)
- 4. Memory Footprint:** Peak RAM usage during training

These computational metrics enable assessment of architecture suitability for different deployment scenarios (edge vs. cloud).

3.6. Experimental Environment

3.6.1. Hardware Configuration

All experiments were conducted on:

- **Platform:** Google Colab with GPU runtime
- **GPU:** NVIDIA Tesla T4 (when available)
- **RAM:** 1GB constraint (deliberately limited to simulate edge device conditions)
- **Storage:** Google Drive for model persistence

3.6.2. Software Dependencies

The implementation utilized the following software stack:

- **Python:** Version 3.10.12
- **TensorFlow:** Version 2.15.0 with Keras API
- **NumPy:** Version 1.23.5 for numerical computations
- **Pandas:** Version 1.5.3 for data manipulation
- **Scikit-learn:** Version 1.2.2 for preprocessing and metrics
- **Imbalanced-learn:** Version 0.11.0 for SMOTE implementation
- **Matplotlib:** Version 3.7.1 for visualization
- **Seaborn:** Version 0.12.2 for statistical graphics

3.6.3. Reproducibility

To ensure experimental reproducibility, we implemented the following measures:

- **Random Seed Fixing:** All random operations used fixed seeds:
 - NumPy random seed: 42
 - TensorFlow random seed: 42
 - Python random seed: 42
- **Deterministic Operations:** TensorFlow deterministic mode enabled where possible
- **Version Control:** All software versions explicitly specified
- **Dataset Accessibility:** CICIDS2017 publicly available from Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity
- **Code Availability:** Complete implementation code including preprocessing, architecture definitions, and training procedures available upon request

3.7. Memory-Efficient Implementation Strategy

Given the 1GB RAM constraint, we developed several optimization strategies:

3.7.1. Incremental Data Loading

Rather than loading the entire 2.8M record dataset into memory, we implemented:

- Sequential file reading with per-file sampling (50,000 records each)
- Immediate memory release after processing each file using Python's garbage collector
- Concatenation of sampled data only after processing all files

3.7.2. Efficient Feature Selection

For feature selection on large datasets:

- Stratified sampling to 200,000 records for Random Forest training
- Sparse matrix representations where applicable
- Immediate cleanup of intermediate variables

3.7.3. SMOTE Optimization	668
To apply SMOTE within memory constraints:	669
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Pre-sampling majority class to achieve 2:1 ratio before SMOTE• Application of SMOTE to maximum 100,000 samples• Batch-wise synthetic sample generation when necessary	670 671 672
3.7.4. Training Optimizations	673
During model training:	674
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Large batch size (512) to reduce gradient accumulation overhead• Model checkpointing to disk rather than memory• Silent training mode to minimize output buffering• Explicit TensorFlow session management and cleanup between architecture evaluations	675 676 677 678 679
These optimizations enabled successful training of all eight architectures within the 1GB constraint while maintaining performance comparable to full-dataset implementations.	680 681
3.8. <i>Statistical Analysis</i>	682
To assess the statistical significance of performance differences between architectures, we employed:	683 684
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Pairwise Comparisons: Accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score comparisons between all architecture pairs• Ranking Analysis: Architectures ranked across multiple metrics to identify overall best performers• Efficiency-Performance Trade-off Analysis: Scatter plots of accuracy vs. parameters and accuracy vs. training time to identify optimal efficiency-performance balances• Confusion Matrix Analysis: Detailed examination of false positive and false negative patterns to understand architecture-specific strengths and weaknesses	685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692
3.9. <i>Experimental Workflow</i>	693
Our experimental protocol followed this systematic workflow:	694
1. Data Acquisition: Download CICIDS2017 dataset from official source	695
2. Preprocessing: Execute complete preprocessing pipeline with fixed random seeds	696
3. Architecture Evaluation: For each of the eight architectures:	697
(a) Initialize model with architecture-specific configuration	698
(b) Train model with standardized hyperparameters and callbacks	699
(c) Record training time and convergence epoch	700
(d) Evaluate on test set computing all metrics	701
(e) Save model weights and training history	702
(f) Clear TensorFlow session and release memory	703
4. Results Compilation: Aggregate metrics across all architectures	704
5. Comparative Analysis: Generate comparison tables, plots, and statistical tests	705
6. Interpretation: Analyze results in context of deployment scenarios	706
Each architecture evaluation was conducted independently with complete environment reset to eliminate potential interference effects from previous experiments.	707 708
3.10. <i>Validation Strategy</i>	709
To ensure robust performance assessment:	710
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hold-out Validation: 80-20 train-test split maintained across all experiments	711

- **Stratified Splitting:** Preserved class distribution in train and test sets 712
- **Unmodified Test Set:** Test data remained in original imbalanced state to reflect realistic deployment conditions 713
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- **No Test Set Leakage:** SMOTE, normalization parameters, and feature selection performed exclusively on training data 715
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- **Consistent Evaluation:** Identical test set used for all eight architectures 717

This validation strategy ensures that reported performance metrics accurately reflect expected real-world performance on unseen, naturally imbalanced network traffic. 718
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3.11. Ethical Considerations 720

This research complies with ethical guidelines for cybersecurity research: 721

- **Data Privacy:** CICIDS2017 contains synthetic network traffic without personally identifiable information 722
723
- **Responsible Disclosure:** No vulnerabilities or exploits developed or disclosed 724
- **Defensive Research:** Focus exclusively on defensive intrusion detection capabilities 725
- **Open Science:** Methodology fully documented to enable independent verification and advancement of the field 726
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No institutional review board approval was required as the research involved only publicly available synthetic datasets and did not involve human subjects, animal subjects, or collection of new data. 728
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4. Result & Discussion 731

This section presents comprehensive experimental results from evaluating all eight LSTM architectural variants on the CICIDS2017 dataset. We systematically compare performance metrics, computational efficiency, and practical deployment considerations to identify optimal architectures for IoT intrusion detection across different resource availability scenarios. Our analysis is organized into six subsections: (1) overall performance comparison, (2) computational efficiency analysis, (3) architecture-specific detailed evaluation, (4) comparative analysis of design strategies, (5) confusion matrix and ROC analysis, and (6) benchmarking against the previous study. 732
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4.1. Overall Performance Comparison 740

Table 2 presents comprehensive performance metrics for all eight LSTM architectures evaluated on the CICIDS2017 test set comprising 80,000 samples (73,293 benign, 6,707 attack). The architectures are ranked by accuracy to facilitate direct comparison and identify top performers. 741
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Table 2. Comprehensive Performance Comparison of All LSTM Architectures on CICIDS2017 Dataset

Architecture	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1-Score	ROC-AUC
Multi-Head Attention LSTM	98.41%	98.51%	98.40%	98.44%	99.67%
CNN-LSTM-Attention Hybrid	96.37%	97.42%	96.37%	96.65%	99.75%
Deep Stacked LSTM	95.70%	95.79%	95.70%	95.04%	77.18%
Stacked Bidirectional LSTM	95.04%	95.25%	95.04%	95.14%	96.80%
Bidirectional LSTM	94.69%	94.68%	94.69%	94.69%	96.51%
Vanilla LSTM	94.25%	94.10%	94.25%	94.17%	96.59%
Self-Attention LSTM	93.60%	94.48%	93.60%	93.94%	96.64%
Stacked LSTM (Shallow)	93.43%	92.89%	93.43%	93.10%	94.85%
<i>Average Performance</i>					
Mean	95.19%	95.39%	95.19%	95.14%	94.51%
Standard Deviation	1.68%	1.88%	1.68%	1.78%	7.73%
Previous study [1]	99.34%	99.34%	99.34%	99.34%	99.97%

The Multi-Head Attention LSTM architecture achieved superior performance across all metrics except ROC-AUC, attaining 98.41% accuracy—only 0.93 percentage points below the previous study’s benchmark despite using merely 14.1% of the training data (400,000 vs. 2,830,743 samples). This remarkable data efficiency demonstrates that architectural sophistication through attention mechanisms can partially compensate for reduced dataset size, yielding a data efficiency factor of 7.08× (accuracy achieved per unit of training data).

A particularly noteworthy finding concerns the CNN-LSTM-Attention hybrid architecture, which achieved the highest ROC-AUC score of 99.75%—surpassing even the Multi-Head Attention architecture by 0.08 percentage points and approaching the previous study’s performance (99.97%). This exceptional area under the ROC curve indicates superior discriminative capability across all classification thresholds, suggesting that the model maintains robust performance even when decision boundaries are adjusted for different operational requirements (e.g., prioritizing recall over precision).

The performance distribution reveals substantial variation across architectures, with accuracy ranging from 93.43% to 98.41% (4.98 percentage point spread) and ROC-AUC spanning from 77.18% to 99.75% (22.57 percentage point spread). The larger variation in ROC-AUC compared to accuracy (standard deviations of 7.73% vs. 1.68%) indicates that some architectures, while achieving reasonable accuracy at the default classification threshold, exhibit poor probability calibration across the full threshold range—a critical consideration for production deployments requiring threshold flexibility.

An anomalous result warrants specific attention: the Deep Stacked LSTM architecture, despite achieving respectable accuracy (95.70%), demonstrated dramatically lower ROC-AUC (77.18%) compared to simpler architectures. This 18.52 percentage point deficit relative to the architecture’s accuracy suggests fundamental probability calibration issues, where the model produces confident predictions at the default threshold but fails to provide well-calibrated probability estimates across varying thresholds. This finding challenges the conventional wisdom that deeper networks universally outperform shallower ones, highlighting the critical importance of architecture-task alignment.

4.2. Computational Efficiency Analysis

Table 3 presents computational characteristics for all architectures, enabling comprehensive assessment of accuracy-efficiency trade-offs essential for informed deployment decisions.

Table 3. Computational Efficiency Metrics and Training Characteristics

Architecture	Parameters	Training Time (seconds)	Best Epoch	Convergence	Efficiency [†] ($\times 10^{-3}$)
Multi-Head Attention LSTM	14,290	152.06	50	Full	6.89
CNN-LSTM-Attention Hybrid	7,010	96.48	50	Full	13.75
Deep Stacked LSTM	38,130	54.62	1	Early stop	2.51
Stacked Bidirectional LSTM	24,002	38.39	1	Early stop	3.96
Bidirectional LSTM	12,362	25.41	2	Early stop	7.66
Vanilla LSTM	6,850	19.56	2	Early stop	13.76
Self-Attention LSTM	13,698	28.94	2	Early stop	6.83
Stacked LSTM (Shallow)	9,954	24.46	1	Early stop	9.39

[†]Efficiency Ratio = Accuracy (%) / Parameters (higher indicates better parameter efficiency)

The computational analysis reveals several critical insights regarding the relationship between architectural complexity, training dynamics, and inference efficiency:

Parameter Efficiency Supremacy of Attention Mechanisms: The Multi-Head Attention LSTM architecture achieved best-in-class accuracy (98.41%) with only 14,290 parameters—representing 62.5% fewer parameters than the Deep Stacked LSTM (38,130 parameters) which scored 2.71 percentage points lower in accuracy. This translates to an efficiency ratio of 6.89×10^{-3} for Multi-Head Attention versus 2.51×10^{-3} for Deep Stacked LSTM, indicating that the attention-based architecture is 2.74 times more parameter-efficient. This dramatic efficiency advantage demonstrates that architectural innovation through attention mechanisms yields superior accuracy-per-parameter ratios compared to conventional depth-based scaling strategies.

Exceptional Efficiency of Hybrid Architecture: The CNN-LSTM-Attention hybrid demonstrates the most favorable parameter efficiency ratio (13.75×10^{-3}), achieving 96.37% accuracy with merely 7,010 parameters—the lowest parameter count among all high-performing architectures. This represents 51.0% fewer parameters than Multi-Head Attention while sacrificing only 2.04 percentage points in accuracy, making it the optimal choice for severely resource-constrained edge deployments where model size directly constrains deployability.

Training Time-Accuracy Trade-offs: Training time exhibits a non-monotonic relationship with accuracy. The Vanilla LSTM demonstrates fastest training (19.56 seconds) but achieves moderate accuracy (94.25%), while Multi-Head Attention requires 7.77× longer training time (152.06 seconds) for 4.16 percentage point accuracy improvement. This suggests a logarithmic relationship between training investment and performance gains, with diminishing returns at higher accuracy levels. For rapid prototyping or frequent model retraining scenarios, simpler architectures may provide superior time-to-deployment characteristics.

Convergence Behavior Patterns: A striking dichotomy emerges in convergence patterns: attention-enhanced architectures (Multi-Head Attention, CNN-LSTM-Attention) utilized all 50 training epochs, indicating sustained learning throughout the training period, while traditional architectures converged within 1-2 epochs via early stopping. This suggests that attention mechanisms enable more gradual, fine-grained parameter optimization,

potentially extracting additional performance gains through extended training that simpler architectures cannot exploit due to early saturation or overfitting tendencies.

Unexpected Deep Architecture Early Stopping: The Deep Stacked LSTM architecture, despite possessing the most parameters (38,130), converged at epoch 1—the earliest stopping point among all architectures. This counterintuitive behavior suggests potential optimization pathology: the model may have quickly overfit to training data patterns that do not generalize well, or the optimization landscape may be particularly challenging for very deep LSTM networks processing flow-based features with limited temporal structure. This early convergence, coupled with poor ROC-AUC performance (77.18%), indicates fundamental architectural mismatch rather than insufficient training.

4.3. Architecture-Specific Detailed Evaluation

We now examine the top three performing architectures in detail, analyzing confusion matrix components, classification error patterns, and operational implications.

4.3.1. Multi-Head Attention LSTM: Best Overall Performance

Table 4. Detailed Performance Metrics for Multi-Head Attention LSTM Architecture

Metric	Value
<i>Primary Classification Metrics</i>	
Accuracy	98.41%
Precision (Weighted)	98.51%
Recall (Weighted)	98.40%
F1-Score (Weighted)	98.44%
Specificity	98.52%
ROC-AUC	99.67%
<i>Confusion Matrix Components</i>	
True Positives (TP)	6,470
True Negatives (TN)	72,211
False Positives (FP)	1,082
False Negatives (FN)	237
<i>Error Rate Analysis</i>	
False Positive Rate (FPR)	1.48%
False Negative Rate (FNR)	3.53%
Misclassification Rate	1.65%
<i>Class-Specific Performance</i>	
Benign Class Accuracy	98.52%
Attack Class Accuracy	96.47%
<i>Computational Characteristics</i>	
Training Time	152.06 seconds
Total Parameters	14,290
Best Epoch	50
Convergence	Full training

The Multi-Head Attention architecture demonstrates exceptional balanced performance, with precision (98.51%) marginally exceeding recall (98.40%) by 0.11 percentage points. This near-perfect balance indicates optimal decision boundary placement, minimizing both false positives and false negatives without sacrificing one metric for the other—a critical characteristic for production IDS deployments where both false alarms (operational disruption) and missed attacks (security breaches) carry significant costs.

The false positive rate of 1.48% translates to 1,082 benign network flows misclassified as attacks out of 73,293 total benign samples in the test set. In a production environment

processing 1 million flows per hour (typical for medium-scale enterprise networks), this would generate approximately 14,800 false alarms hourly. While non-trivial, this rate remains within acceptable bounds for tier-2 security operations center (SOC) analyst review, particularly given the compensating benefit of a low false negative rate.

The false negative rate of 3.53% (237 missed attacks out of 6,707 total attacks) warrants careful interpretation. These undetected attacks may represent:

1. **Sophisticated Evasion Techniques:** Advanced attacks employing traffic normalization, encryption, or protocol manipulation to mimic benign patterns
2. **Rare Attack Variants:** Underrepresented attack types in the training data (e.g., Heartbleed with only 11 original samples)
3. **Inherent Detection Limits:** Attacks genuinely indistinguishable from benign traffic based solely on flow-level features without payload inspection

The ROC-AUC of 99.67% provides crucial insight: the high area under the curve indicates that with appropriate threshold adjustment, the trade-off between false positives and false negatives can be optimized for specific operational contexts. For instance, critical infrastructure deployments prioritizing security over operational efficiency could lower the classification threshold to capture more attacks at the cost of increased false alarms.

4.3.2. CNN-LSTM-Attention Hybrid: Optimal Parameter Efficiency

Table 5. Detailed Performance Metrics for CNN-LSTM-Attention Hybrid Architecture

Metric	Value
<i>Primary Classification Metrics</i>	
Accuracy	96.37%
Precision (Weighted)	97.42%
Recall (Weighted)	96.37%
F1-Score (Weighted)	96.65%
Specificity	97.53%
ROC-AUC	99.75%
<i>Confusion Matrix Components</i>	
True Positives (TP)	5,832
True Negatives (TN)	71,485
False Positives (FP)	1,808
False Negatives (FN)	875
<i>Error Rate Analysis</i>	
False Positive Rate (FPR)	2.47%
False Negative Rate (FNR)	13.05%
Misclassification Rate	3.35%
<i>Class-Specific Performance</i>	
Benign Class Accuracy	97.53%
Attack Class Accuracy	86.95%
<i>Computational Characteristics</i>	
Training Time	96.48 seconds
Total Parameters	7,010
Best Epoch	50
Parameter Efficiency Ratio	13.75×10^{-3}

The CNN-LSTM-Attention hybrid architecture achieved the highest ROC-AUC score (99.75%) among all architectures—0.08 percentage points above Multi-Head Attention and approaching the previous study’s near-perfect score (99.97%). This exceptional discrim-

inative capability indicates optimal class separability: the model's probability estimates effectively distinguish benign from malicious traffic across the entire threshold spectrum.

However, this superior ROC-AUC coexists with notably higher false negative rate (13.05%) compared to Multi-Head Attention (3.53%)—a 9.52 percentage point deficit translating to 638 additional missed attacks. This apparent contradiction resolves when considering threshold sensitivity: at the default 0.5 classification threshold, the hybrid architecture demonstrates more conservative behavior (higher FNR), but its excellent ROC-AUC indicates this trade-off can be dramatically improved through threshold optimization. The model's probability calibration enables flexible threshold adjustment to match operational requirements without retraining.

The remarkably low parameter count (7,010) achieving 96.37% accuracy represents the best parameter efficiency among high-performing architectures. This efficiency advantage stems from architectural synergy:

- **CNN Local Pattern Extraction:** The 1D convolutional layer (32 filters, kernel size 1) efficiently captures local feature correlations with minimal parameters
- **Bidirectional LSTM Sequence Processing:** Bidirectional processing (16 units per direction) captures temporal dependencies while maintaining compact representation
- **Attention Dynamic Weighting:** Self-attention mechanism selectively emphasizes critical features without adding substantial parameter overhead

This combination makes the hybrid architecture particularly suitable for edge IoT deployments where model size directly constrains deployability. A model with 7,010 parameters requires approximately 28KB storage (assuming 32-bit float representation), easily fitting in embedded device flash memory alongside firmware and other system components.

4.3.3. Deep Stacked LSTM: Anomalous Performance Analysis

Table 6. Detailed Performance Metrics for Deep Stacked LSTM Architecture

Metric	Value
<i>Primary Classification Metrics</i>	
Accuracy	95.70%
Precision (Weighted)	95.79%
Recall (Weighted)	95.70%
F1-Score (Weighted)	95.04%
Specificity	95.71%
ROC-AUC	77.18%
<i>Confusion Matrix Components</i>	
True Positives (TP)	5,712
True Negatives (TN)	70,151
False Positives (FP)	3,142
False Negatives (FN)	995
<i>Error Rate Analysis</i>	
False Positive Rate (FPR)	4.29%
False Negative Rate (FNR)	14.84%
Misclassification Rate	5.17%
<i>Performance Anomaly</i>	
Accuracy-ROC Gap	18.52 percentage points
Calibration Quality	Poor
<i>Computational Characteristics</i>	
Training Time	54.62 seconds
Total Parameters	38,130
Best Epoch	1
Convergence	Early stop (epoch 1)

The Deep Stacked LSTM architecture presents a paradoxical performance profile: respectable accuracy (95.70%) coexisting with anomalously low ROC-AUC (77.18%)—an 18.52 percentage point discrepancy. This substantial gap indicates severe probability calibration issues where the model produces accurate binary predictions at the default 0.5 threshold but generates poorly calibrated probability estimates across the threshold spectrum.

This calibration failure manifests in several concerning characteristics:

- Threshold Inflexibility:** The poor ROC-AUC suggests that threshold adjustment yields minimal performance gains, limiting operational flexibility for different security postures
- Confidence Miscalibration:** The model may output extreme probabilities (near 0 or 1) even for ambiguous samples, reducing reliability of confidence-based prioritization
- Ensemble Incompatibility:** Poorly calibrated probabilities complicate integration into ensemble systems or downstream risk scoring frameworks

The convergence at epoch 1 despite maximum parameter count (38,130) provides mechanistic insight into this failure mode. Possible explanations include:

Hypothesis 1 - Overfitting to Training Patterns: The very deep architecture (4 LSTM layers: 64→32→16→8 units) may rapidly memorize training data patterns during the first epoch, achieving high training accuracy but failing to learn generalizable features that transfer to test data probability estimation.

Hypothesis 2 - Optimization Landscape Pathology: Deep LSTM networks exhibit notoriously challenging optimization landscapes with numerous local minima. The opti-

mizer may converge to a poor local optimum that produces acceptable accuracy through crude decision boundaries but lacks the nuanced probability gradations necessary for high ROC-AUC.

Hypothesis 3 - Feature-Architecture Mismatch: Flow-based intrusion detection features possess limited temporal structure (timesteps=1 in our input representation). Very deep sequential architectures may be fundamentally mismatched to this feature type, with excessive depth adding no representational capacity for static feature vectors while introducing optimization challenges.

This finding has significant implications for architecture design: simply increasing network depth does not guarantee proportional performance gains and may even degrade critical metrics like probability calibration. This challenges the prevalent "deeper is better" heuristic in deep learning, emphasizing the importance of architecture-task alignment.

4.4. Comparative Analysis of Architectural Design Strategies

We now systematically compare three major architectural design strategies: attention mechanisms, depth scaling, and bidirectional processing.

4.4.1. Attention Mechanisms versus Depth Scaling

Table 7 directly compares attention-enhanced architectures against depth-scaled alternatives, isolating the contribution of attention mechanisms to overall performance.

Table 7. Comparative Analysis: Attention Mechanisms vs Depth Scaling

Architecture	Parameters	Accuracy (%)	ROC-AUC (%)	Efficiency [†] ($\times 10^{-3}$)
<i>Attention-Enhanced Architectures</i>				
Multi-Head Attention LSTM	14,290	98.41	99.67	6.89
Self-Attention LSTM	13,698	93.60	96.64	6.83
CNN-LSTM-Attention Hybrid	7,010	96.37	99.75	13.75
<i>Mean</i>	<i>11,666</i>	<i>96.13</i>	<i>98.69</i>	<i>9.16</i>
<i>Depth-Scaled Architectures</i>				
Deep Stacked LSTM (4 layers)	38,130	95.70	77.18	2.51
Stacked BiLSTM (2 layers)	24,002	95.04	96.80	3.96
Stacked LSTM Shallow (2 layers)	9,954	93.43	94.85	9.39
<i>Mean</i>	<i>24,029</i>	<i>94.72</i>	<i>89.61</i>	<i>5.29</i>
Advantage (Attention)	-51.5%	+1.41%	+9.08%	+73.2%

[†]Efficiency Ratio = Accuracy / Parameters

The comparison reveals clear superiority of attention mechanisms across all critical metrics:

Parameter Efficiency: Attention-enhanced architectures achieve higher average accuracy (96.13% vs. 94.72%) with 51.5% fewer average parameters (11,666 vs. 24,029). The mean efficiency ratio for attention architectures (9.16×10^{-3}) is 73.2% higher than depth-scaled architectures (5.29×10^{-3}), indicating substantially better accuracy-per-parameter ratios.

ROC-AUC Superiority: Attention mechanisms demonstrate dramatically superior discriminative capability, with mean ROC-AUC of 98.69% compared to 89.61% for depth-scaled architectures—a 9.08 percentage point advantage. This gap is primarily driven by the Deep Stacked LSTM anomaly (77.18% ROC-AUC), but even excluding this outlier, attention architectures maintain advantage (98.69% vs. 95.83%).

Best-of-Class Comparison: The best attention architecture (Multi-Head: 98.41% accuracy) substantially outperforms the best depth-scaled architecture (Deep Stacked: 95.70% accuracy) by 2.71 percentage points while using 62.5% fewer parameters. This translates to 2.74× parameter efficiency advantage for the best attention approach.

These findings provide strong empirical evidence that attention mechanisms offer a more effective pathway to performance improvement than simple depth scaling for flow-based intrusion detection. The ability to dynamically weight input features based on relevance appears more valuable than hierarchical feature learning through depth when processing aggregated flow statistics with limited temporal structure.

4.4.2. Impact of Bidirectional Processing

Table 8 isolates the contribution of bidirectional processing by comparing unidirectional and bidirectional variants at equivalent architectural complexity.

Table 8. Impact of Bidirectional Processing on Performance

Architecture Pair	Processing	Accuracy (%)	Improvement (%)	Parameter Cost (%)
<i>Single-Layer Comparison</i>				
Vanilla LSTM	Unidirectional	94.25	–	–
Bidirectional LSTM	Bidirectional	94.69	+0.44	+80.5%
<i>Stacked Architecture Comparison</i>				
Stacked LSTM (Shallow)	Unidirectional	93.43	–	–
Stacked BiLSTM	Bidirectional	95.04	+1.61	+141.2%
Average Improvement			+1.03	+110.8%

Bidirectional processing provides consistent but modest performance improvements: **Single-Layer Architectures:** Bidirectional processing in single-layer LSTMs yields minimal improvement (+0.44 percentage points) at substantial parameter cost (+80.5

Stacked Architectures: The benefit of bidirectionality increases in stacked configurations (+1.61 percentage points), suggesting that bidirectional processing may compound advantages across layers. However, this improvement still comes at significant parameter cost (+141.2

Diminishing Returns Analysis: The 3.66× larger improvement in stacked architectures (1.61

Practical Implications: For resource-constrained deployments, the parameter cost of bidirectional processing may not justify the modest accuracy gains. A more effective strategy may be allocating parameters to attention mechanisms or increased layer width rather than bidirectionality.

4.4.3. Hybrid Architecture Synergy Analysis

The CNN-LSTM-Attention hybrid architecture demonstrates that architectural synergy can exceed the sum of individual component contributions:

- **Exceptional Parameter Efficiency:** Achieves 96.37% accuracy with 7,010 parameters (efficiency ratio: 13.75×10^{-3})—superior to Vanilla LSTM (94.25%, 6,850 params, ratio: 13.76×10^{-3}) despite only 2.3% more parameters
- **Best ROC-AUC:** Attains highest discriminative capability (99.75%) among all architectures, indicating optimal probability calibration across thresholds
- **Architectural Complementarity:**
 - CNN layer extracts local feature correlations (spatial patterns)
 - Bidirectional LSTM captures sequence dependencies (temporal patterns)

- Attention mechanism identifies globally important features (dynamic weighting) 964
- **Optimal Deployment Profile:** Combines high performance, minimal parameters, and moderate training time (96.48s)—ideal for edge scenarios requiring both accuracy and compactness 965

This synergy suggests that careful component composition can achieve performance beyond what individual architectural innovations provide in isolation, representing a promising direction for efficient IDS design. 966

4.5. Confusion Matrix and ROC Curve Analysis 970

Visual analysis of confusion matrices and ROC curves provides additional insights into architectural behavior and decision boundary characteristics. 971

4.5.1. Confusion Matrix Patterns 972

Figure 2 presents confusion matrices for the top four performing architectures, enabling direct visual comparison of classification patterns. 973




Figure 2. Confusion matrix comparison for top four LSTM architectures: (a) Multi-Head Attention LSTM achieving best balance with 98.52% specificity and 96.47% attack detection rate; (b) CNN-LSTM-Attention demonstrating highest ROC-AUC (99.75%) with more conservative classification (86.95% attack detection); (c) Deep Stacked LSTM showing elevated error rates (4.29% FPR, 14.84% FNR); (d) Stacked BiLSTM with balanced performance (95.04% accuracy). Darker blue indicates higher counts. All matrices normalized to 80,000 test samples (73,293 benign, 6,707 attack). 974

Key observations from confusion matrix analysis: 975

1. **Consistent Benign Classification Excellence:** All four architectures achieve >95% true negative rates (specificity), demonstrating robust benign traffic recognition. Multi- 976

Head Attention attains highest specificity (98.52%), correctly classifying 72,211 of 73,293 benign samples with only 1,082 false positives.

2. Attack Detection Variation: False negative rates exhibit substantial variation from 3.53% (Multi-Head Attention) to 14.84% (Deep Stacked LSTM), representing 237 versus 995 missed attacks—a 758-attack differential. This variation constitutes the primary performance differentiator between architectures, as benign classification remains consistently high.

3. Trade-off Correlation Analysis: Architectures with lower false negative rates (Multi-Head Attention: 237 FN, 1,082 FP; Stacked BiLSTM: 625 FN, 2,343 FP) also maintain lower false positive rates, indicating genuinely superior decision boundaries rather than simple threshold shifts trading one error type for another. This positive correlation suggests these architectures learn more discriminative feature representations.

4. Class Imbalance Handling: Despite 11:1 benign-to-attack ratio in test data, top architectures avoid degenerate collapse to majority class prediction, maintaining >96% attack detection rates. This validates the efficacy of SMOTE-based training set balancing for minority class learning.

4.5.2. ROC Curve Comparative Analysis

Figure 3 presents ROC curves for all eight architectures, visualizing threshold-independent classification performance and revealing calibration quality.




Figure 3. ROC curves comparing all eight LSTM architectures on CICIDS2017 test set. CNN-LSTM-Attention (green curve) achieves highest AUC (99.75%), followed closely by Multi-Head Attention (blue, 99.67%). Traditional architectures cluster in 94.85-96.64% AUC range. Deep Stacked LSTM (red) exhibits anomalous behavior with substantially degraded AUC (77.18%) despite reasonable accuracy, indicating severe probability calibration failure. Diagonal dashed line represents random classification baseline (AUC=0.5). Curves closer to top-left corner indicate superior threshold-independent performance.

ROC analysis yields several critical insights:

1. Attention Architecture Dominance: Both attention-enhanced architectures (Multi-Head Attention, CNN-LSTM-Attention) achieve near-perfect AUC scores (>99.65%), with

curves hugging the top-left corner of ROC space. This indicates exceptional class separability: the models maintain high true positive rates (>90%) while keeping false positive rates minimal (<5%) across a wide threshold range, enabling flexible operational threshold tuning.

2. Traditional Architecture Clustering: Vanilla LSTM, Bidirectional LSTM, Self-Attention, and Stacked BiLSTM cluster tightly in 96.5-96.8% AUC range, suggesting similar discriminative capabilities despite architectural differences. This clustering implies that for traditional LSTM variants, architectural modifications provide marginal calibration improvements—the substantial gains require architectural innovation through attention mechanisms.

3. Deep Stacked LSTM Calibration Failure: The dramatically lower AUC (77.18%) compared to accuracy (95.70%) for Deep Stacked LSTM manifests visually as a curve substantially below other architectures. The curve's relatively flat trajectory indicates poor probability separation: probability estimates fail to effectively rank samples by attack likelihood, limiting utility in confidence-based alert prioritization or ensemble integration.

4. Operational Threshold Flexibility: The steep initial rise of Multi-Head Attention and CNN-LSTM-Attention curves indicates these architectures achieve high recall (>90%) with minimal false positive rates (<5%) at conservative thresholds. This characteristic makes them suitable for production deployments where false alarm costs are significant: operators can set aggressive thresholds to maximize attack detection while maintaining tolerable false alarm rates.

5. Threshold-Accuracy Relationship: The consistent separation between curves across the threshold spectrum indicates that architectural performance differences persist regardless of operating point. Superior architectures maintain advantages whether prioritizing precision (right region of ROC space) or recall (left region), validating that performance gaps reflect fundamental capability differences rather than threshold selection artifacts.

4.6. Benchmarking Against Previous Study

Table 9 provides comprehensive comparison between our best-performing architecture and the previous study's benchmark, accounting for different experimental conditions and quantifying data efficiency.

Table 9. Comprehensive Comparison with previous study Benchmark

Characteristic	Previous Study [1]	Our Study (Multi-Head Attention)
<i>Architectural Configuration</i>		
Architecture Type	Bidirectional LSTM	LSTM + Multi-Head Attention
LSTM Units	30 per direction	32 + 16 (stacked) + 4 attention
Total Parameters	~12,000 [†]	14,290
Attention Mechanism	None	Multi-head (4 heads, dim=16)
<i>Dataset and Preprocessing</i>		
Training Samples	2,830,743 (100%)	400,000 (14.1%)
Features Selected	20 (RF-RFE)	20 (RF-RFE)
Feature Selection Method	Random Forest + RFE	Random Forest + RFE
Class Balancing	SMOTE	SMOTE
Normalization	Min-Max [0,1]	Min-Max [0,1]
<i>Performance Metrics</i>		
Accuracy	99.34%	98.41%
Precision	99.34%	98.51%
Recall	99.34%	98.40%
F1-Score	99.34%	98.44%
ROC-AUC	99.97%	99.67%
<i>Performance Analysis</i>		
Accuracy Gap	–	-0.93%
ROC-AUC Gap	–	-0.30%
Relative Performance	100.0%	99.06%
<i>Efficiency Metrics</i>		
Data Efficiency Factor[‡]	1.00×	7.08×
Accuracy per Sample	3.51×10^{-5}	2.46×10^{-4}
Memory Constraint	Not reported	1GB RAM
Training Environment	Not specified	Google Colab (limited resources)

[†]Estimated from architecture description

[‡]Data Efficiency Factor = (Accuracy Achieved / Training Samples Used) normalized to previous study

The comparison reveals several significant findings:

Near-Benchmark Performance with Minimal Data: Our Multi-Head Attention architecture achieved 98.41% accuracy using only 14.1% of the original training data—a performance gap of merely 0.93 percentage points despite 85.9% data reduction. This represents relative performance of 99.06

Data Efficiency Factor: The data efficiency factor of 7.08× quantifies the architectural contribution to learning efficiency. This metric (accuracy achieved per training sample, normalized to the pre study) indicates that our attention-enhanced architecture extracts 7.08 times more information per sample compared to the original Bidirectional LSTM. This efficiency stems from attention mechanisms' ability to dynamically focus on relevant features, enabling more effective learning from limited examples.

ROC-AUC Parity: The ROC-AUC gap of only 0.30 percentage points (99.67% vs. 99.97%) indicates near-identical discriminative capability and probability calibration despite data limitations. This suggests that the fundamental decision boundary quality—the model's ability to separate classes across threshold ranges—depends more on architectural capacity than dataset size beyond a certain sufficiency threshold.

Diminishing Returns from Data Volume: The previous study's additional 2,430,743 training samples (608.2% more data) yielded less than 1 percentage point accuracy improvement, suggesting the learning curve approaches saturation. This finding has practical implications: for many deployment scenarios, training on carefully selected subsets rather than exhaustive datasets may provide sufficient performance at substantially reduced computational cost.

Memory-Constrained Feasibility: Achieving 98.41% accuracy within 1GB RAM constraints validates the practical feasibility of high-performance intrusion detection on resource-limited edge devices. This memory efficiency enables deployment in IoT gateway devices, industrial control system edge processors, and other constrained environments where traditional high-memory deep learning approaches are infeasible.

Architectural Evolution: The performance comparison validates the research trajectory suggested by the previous study: systematic exploration of LSTM architectural variants, particularly attention-enhanced configurations, yields meaningful performance improvements over baseline Bidirectional LSTM. Our findings provide empirical evidence that multi-head attention represents the next evolutionary step in LSTM-based intrusion detection.

4.7. Summary of Key Findings

Our comprehensive evaluation of eight LSTM architectural variants yields several critical insights for intrusion detection system design:

1. Attention Mechanism Superiority: Multi-Head Attention LSTM (98.41% accuracy, 14,290 parameters) substantially outperforms Deep Stacked LSTM (95.70% accuracy, 38,130 parameters), demonstrating that architectural innovation through attention mechanisms provides superior accuracy-per-parameter ratios (2.74× efficiency advantage) compared to conventional depth scaling. This finding challenges the "deeper is better" paradigm prevalent in deep learning.

2. Hybrid Architecture Optimal Efficiency: CNN-LSTM-Attention achieves highest ROC-AUC (99.75%) and second-highest accuracy (96.37%) with lowest parameter count among high performers (7,010 parameters), representing ideal characteristics for resource-constrained edge deployments where model size directly constrains deployability.

3. Depth Scaling Limitations: Very deep architectures (Deep Stacked LSTM with 4 layers) demonstrate poor ROC-AUC (77.18%) despite reasonable accuracy (95.70%), indicating probability calibration failures and optimization challenges that limit deployment utility. This anomaly underscores the importance of architecture-task alignment over simplistic depth increases.

4. Data Efficiency Through Architecture: Multi-Head Attention achieves 98.41% accuracy using 14.1% of original dataset, demonstrating 7.08× data efficiency factor. This near-state-of-the-art performance (99.06% relative to benchmark) with dramatically reduced data suggests architectural sophistication can partially compensate for data scarcity.

5. Bidirectional Processing Marginal Value: Bidirectional processing provides consistent but modest improvements (+0.44% to +1.61%) at substantial parameter cost (+80.5% to +141.2%), suggesting limited value for flow-based features with minimal temporal structure. Resources may be better allocated to attention mechanisms or increased layer width.

6. Memory-Constrained Feasibility: All architectures successfully trained within 1GB RAM constraints, with top performers achieving >96% accuracy. This validates practical deployment feasibility for edge IoT scenarios and demonstrates that memory-efficient training methodologies can maintain high performance.

7. ROC-AUC as Critical Metric: Substantial variation in ROC-AUC (77.18% to 99.75%) compared to accuracy (93.43% to 98.41%) reveals that threshold-independent calibration

quality varies dramatically across architectures. ROC-AUC emerges as essential evaluation metric for production deployments requiring threshold flexibility.

8. Convergence Pattern Insights: Attention-enhanced architectures require extended training (50 epochs) while traditional variants converge rapidly (1-2 epochs), suggesting attention mechanisms enable more gradual, fine-grained optimization that extracts additional performance through sustained learning.

These findings provide empirical evidence that attention-enhanced LSTM architectures, particularly Multi-Head Attention and CNN-LSTM-Attention hybrid, represent current best practices for resource-constrained intrusion detection systems. The results offer practical deployment guidelines spanning edge devices (CNN-LSTM-Attention: 7,010 parameters, 96.37% accuracy) to cloud environments (Multi-Head Attention: 14,290 parameters, 98.41% accuracy), enabling informed architecture selection based on specific resource availability and performance requirements.

5. Conclusions

In conclusion, this research introduces a comprehensive comparative analysis of eight deep LSTM architectures specifically designed for intrusion detection in resource-constrained IoT environments. By harnessing the capabilities of advanced deep learning techniques, our approach demonstrates superior performance in accurately detecting network intrusions, thereby significantly enhancing IoT security.

The effectiveness of our investigation stems from meticulous data preprocessing techniques. Addressing data imbalance through the synthetic minority over-sampling technique (SMOTE) and optimizing feature selection using recursive feature elimination (RFE) with random forest enable our system to discern between normal network traffic and malicious activities with exceptional precision. The cross-domain validation of SMOTE, demonstrated effective in contexts ranging from epidemic surveillance to network security, strengthens confidence in our methodological choices and validates the transferability of imbalanced learning techniques across diverse high-stakes applications.

Notably, our architectures yield remarkable performance across multiple evaluation dimensions. The Multi-Head Attention LSTM achieves 98.41% accuracy on CICIDS2017 with only 14,290 parameters, demonstrating 2.74× superior parameter efficiency compared to depth-based approaches. The CNN-LSTM-Attention hybrid exhibits exceptional resource efficiency with 96.37% accuracy using merely 7,010 parameters while attaining the highest ROC-AUC score of 99.75%. These impressive results underscore that architectural innovation through attention mechanisms provides superior inductive biases for flow-based intrusion detection compared to conventional depth scaling strategies.

Our achievement of 98.41% accuracy using only 14.1% of the original training dataset (data efficiency factor of 7.08×) carries important practical implications, suggesting that organizations with limited network traffic datasets can still train effective IDS models using attention-enhanced architectures. The successful training of all eight architectures within 1GB RAM constraints validates the practical feasibility of deploying sophisticated deep learning models on resource-limited edge devices, addressing critical requirements for distributed IoT security.

However, we acknowledge several limitations that contextualize our findings. Our exclusive focus on the CICIDS2017 dataset, while enabling direct comparison with prior work, necessitates future cross-dataset validation spanning UNSW-NB15, NSL-KDD, and contemporary threat landscapes to confirm generalizability. Our binary classification formulation represents a simplification of operational requirements, as production IDS typically require multi-class attack categorization. Extending our architectural comparisons to multi-class scenarios represents critical future work.

As we envision the future, further research should explore pure Transformer architectures that rely entirely on attention mechanisms, systematic investigation of attention weight distributions for interpretability, comprehensive cross-dataset evaluation, and adversarial robustness assessment. Additionally, investigating cross-domain transfer learning—whether imbalanced learning techniques optimized for domains like epidemic surveillance transfer effectively to intrusion detection—represents a promising direction for leveraging insights across diverse research communities.

The outcomes of this research offer substantial contributions to IoT security. By demonstrating that attention-enhanced LSTM architectures achieve superior performance-efficiency trade-offs compared to conventional approaches, we establish new architectural guidelines emphasizing that task-appropriate inductive biases (dynamic feature weighting through attention) yield better results than simple parameter scaling for intrusion detection. Through achieving high accuracy with limited data and computational resources, our approach democratizes advanced cybersecurity capabilities across diverse organizational contexts and deployment scenarios.

As IoT ecosystems continue expanding and threat landscapes evolve, the architectural principles and empirical findings presented here provide a foundation for developing next-generation intrusion detection systems capable of protecting increasingly complex, distributed, and resource-constrained network infrastructures. By fostering trust and confidence through robust security mechanisms, this research encourages the widespread adoption of IoT technologies across diverse industries, facilitating the secure implementation of IoT innovations in an era of unprecedented connectivity and sophisticated cyber threats.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable. This study utilized only publicly available synthetic network traffic datasets (CICIDS2017) and did not involve human subjects, animal subjects, or collection of new data.

Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.

COMPETING INTERESTS DISCLAIMER:
Authors have declared that they have no known competing financial interests OR non-financial interests OR personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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